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Abstract
The work of the Marxist historian Jamāl al-Dīn Bai Shouyi (1909–2000), a member of 
the Chinese Muslim Hui ethnic group, offers a window into the close and complex rela-
tion between the contested categories of politics, religion, and ethnicity in modern Chi-
nese intellectual history, particularly with respect to the historical development of Chi-
nese Muslim identity in its encounter with Marxist historical materialism. In this article, 
I provide a limited case study of this broader problematic by analysing Bai’s writings on 
Hui identity. In doing so, I attempt to contextualise his arguments with reference to the 
changing status of religion in contemporary Chinese Marxist discourse, and reflect on the 
entanglement of nationalism, religion, and ethnopolitics in modern China. 
Keywords: Islam in modern China, historical materialism, Bai Shouyi, ethnicity, religion, 
nationalism
Od religije k revoluciji … in nacionalizmu: Sino-muslimanska identiteta in his-
torični materializem v delih Džamala al-Dina, znanega kot Bai Shouyi, in drugje
Izvleček
Delo marksističnega zgodovinarja Bai Shouyija (1909–2000), člana kitajske muslimanske 
etnične skupnosti Hui, ponuja vpogled v tesne in kompleksne odnose med spornimi kate-
gorijami politike, religije in etičnosti v moderni kitajski intelektualni zgodovini, še posebej 
glede na zgodovinski razvoj muslimanske identitete na Kitajskem, na katerega je med 
drugim vplival marksistični historični materializem. V tem članku ponujam del študije 
širše problematike z analizo Baijevih spisov o sino-muslimanski identiteti. S tem želim 
kontekstualizirati njegove argumente s sklicevanjem na spreminjajoč se status religije v 
sodobnem kitajskem marksističnem diskurzu in razmisliti o prepletu nacionalizma, religi-
je in etnopolitike v moderni Kitajski.
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I suppose you have a new slogan now, that “There is no God but Allah, but both 
Mohammed and Marx are his prophets” I suggested. But none of them would 
commit himself on such a ticklish question. They were prepared to march under 
the Red Star and the Crescent, but had not yet embroidered the name “Karl 
Marx” on their prayer rugs. (Nym Wales 1939, 163)
The Contested Meaning of Religion: Self-Reference and Substitution
It is probably no longer controversial to claim that terms such as “religion,” “eth-
nicity,” “philosophy,” “science,” “politics,” “society,” and “culture” do not simply denote 
natural or unproblematic categories which can straightforwardly serve to organise 
our academic knowledge of the world. Rather, they can be taken as referring to 
fluid, culturally variable, and thus highly contestable domains of knowledge and 
action used to describe, locate, and renegotiate human experiences, behaviour, be-
liefs, expectations, and identities within the field of social existence. Even if this 
is arrived at via negationis (e.g. “I am not a religious person,” “Chinese thought is 
not philosophy”), it seems unlikely that our self-understanding on a more every-
day level can remain immune to these basic coordinates of an epistemological and 
institutional order which spread across the globe in a process we usually refer to as 
“modernisation” (which is in fact another of those terms). 
The history of how a society such as China came to absorb and reinterpret this 
order under the direct impact of far-reaching socio-political transformations has 
already given rise to an immense scholarly literature.1 Crucially, none of the terms I 
listed above had a direct semantic equivalent in traditional Chinese taxonomies of 
knowledge or imaginaries of everyday experience. The forced entry of China into 
the colonial horizon of modernity, usually taken as occurring with the outbreak of 
the First Opium War in 1839, gave rise to an increasingly extensive application of 
what would later become known as the “Needham question,” which famously asked 
why China had failed to develop modern science despite its considerable techno-
logical know-how. In a sense, starting from the late Qing period, this question came 
to be applied to nearly every one of the familiar, but at the same time highly inde-
terminate, terms which serve as coordinates in our current epistemological land-
scape. Where was religion, where was philosophy, where was (democratic) politics 
in traditional China? What does it mean to say, for example, that Confucianism was 
a form of philosophy and not a religion? Were these fields of learning and action 
insufficiently differentiated or did they rather form of more organic and integrated 
1 To get a sense of the scope of this transformation, good places to start are Lackner and Vittinghoff 
(2004) and Jin and Liu (2009).
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whole in the past?2 And how, as Hu Shi 胡适 (1891–1962) put it, “can we best 
assimilate modern civilisation in such a manner as to make it congenial and con-
gruous and continuous with the civilisation of our own making?” (Sela 2017, 336).
The broader stakes behind the overall question as to how retroactively applying 
these categories to different historical and cultural contexts affects and possibly 
distorts our understanding are well-known, and are often presented as very high 
indeed. The word “Eurocentrism,” while hardly explanatory or helpful in itself, is 
frequently used as a stand-in for the whole range of problems which this question 
entails. The close link between colonialism and the emergence of the discipline 
of religious studies, for instance, has been well documented and closely analysed 
(see Masuzawa 2005; Chidester 2014).3 As such, it is not hard to see why such 
categories, when imposed on the non-Western “Other,” are assumed to behave not 
like positive conditions of the possibility for the experience of historical or cultural 
alterity, but rather as rendering the latter inaccessible, or, conversely, reducing it to 
an imperfect adumbration of “Western” modernity. Efforts to retrieve the dawning 
of modernity or certain features of modernity in, for example, the work of thinkers 
from the Warring States Period (481–221 BCE) may succeed in restoring their 
normative validity or at least potential, but at the same time remain open to the 
accusation that they have failed to displace the standards of normativity used in the 
process by confining these “masters” (zi 子) to the domain of “philosophy.” Conse-
quently, the much sought-after cultural particularity of Chinese thought risks being 
ignored or even effaced, thereby revealing, to quote the subtitle of Tomoko Masuza-
wa’s (2005) study on the invention of the notion of world religions, “how Western 
universalism was preserved in the language of pluralism.”
In a more general sense, it is worth pointing out that while individual identity is 
assumed to be a basic concern of people and communities in modern society, the latter 
are forced to make do with established (or to put it in stronger terms, “hegemonic”) and 
communicatively recognizable means of identification and individualisation.4 None of 
this means that the epistemological and identitary coordinates I listed above can be 
treated as known quantities, quite the opposite. While everyday communication does 
2 For Liang Qichao 梁启超 (1873–1929), even the very category of “history” and “historiography,” 
as a mode of social analysis conductive to simultaneously constructing and “saving” the nation, had 
to be invented by breaking with “old history,” the twenty-four traditional dynastic histories in his 
view not being histories at all, but rather “genealogies of twenty-four clans” (Sela 2017, 328).
3 On the introduction of the category of “religion” and the discipline of religious studies in modern 
China, see Kuo (2010) and Meyer (2015).
4 This explains the increasing ineptitude of claims to individual “authenticity,” and instead strengthens 
the appeal of enacting one’s social roles through what Hans-Georg Moeller and Paul J. D’Ambrosio 
have analysed as “genuine pretending” (see Moeller and D’Ambrosio 2017).
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not require (and often shuns) exact definitions, the coordinating or orienting function 
of a term such as “religion” may not be immediately apparent on this level, seeing how 
religion is increasingly presented as a source of social conflict or even the dominant 
factor behind a veritable “clash of civilisations.” Arguably, the word “religion” in par-
ticular often serves to interrupt, complicate, or even preclude communication in the 
self-proclaimed secular societies of Western Europe and North America. 
Additionally, the fact that I was personally unable to find a way around using the 
adjectives “culturally variable” and “social” immediately after having enumerated “cul-
ture” and “society” as examples of contested domains of knowledge and practice in 
the first paragraph of my paper, perhaps already indicates that it is hard to avoid a 
certain circularity in trying to pinpoint the historically specific semantic baggage of 
such terms. It would not be all that unusual to say, for instance, that the notion of 
culture is itself culturally variable (see for example Botz-Bornstein 2010), or more 
generally to see the explanandum recurring inside of the explanans. While such terms 
are obviously not devoid of more or less determinate extra-linguistic referents, there 
seems to be no other way but to gradually proceed by way of self-reference in using 
or reinterpreting them. From the perspective of Niklas Luhmann’s conception of 
meaning as an “autopoetic” medium of communication (for the case of “religion” as 
a form of meaning in particular, see Luhmann (2013, 1–35), this can hardly be acci-
dental. The detour through self-reference seems unavoidable, even when the use of a 
term such as “religion” is deemed to be fundamentally unhelpful and even distorting 
in the study of premodern or non-Western societies, simply because any determinate 
negation of the category of “the religious” must specify how and why the meaning 
of “religion” has to be displaced or translated into something else altogether. Conse-
quently, one has to proceed by dismantling “religion,” so to speak, from the inside out. 
To give a specific example drawn from modern Chinese intellectual history, when the phi-
losopher Xie Youwei 谢幼伟 (1903–1976) argued that there had never been such a thing 
as “religion” in traditional China, understood as a discrete form of ritual and spiritual prac-
tice concerned with a domain clearly marked off against “immanent” or “secular” social 
existence and interaction, he at the same time felt compelled to argue that the Confucian 
notion of “filial piety” (xiao 孝) could serve as a this-worldly and human-oriented “sub-
stitute” (代替品) for religion. In his view, filial piety could take over religion’s supposed 
socially integrating and emotionally comforting function, without reproducing the cate-
gorical divide between the domains of the human and the transcendent he associated with 
Christianity (see Xie 1946, 5–8).5 Xie’s negation of “religion” then was coupled to a certain 
anxiety over losing something seen as essential and crucial, specifically to modernising 
5 As Goossaert and Palmer argue, Christianity often served as the institutional “model religion” in 
Republican China (see Goossaert and Palmer 2011, 67–89).
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societies, in the process.6 In other words, from a historically sensitive perspective, the ques-
tion for us becomes not so much what religion is, but rather what it is being distinguished 
from, what such a distinction is intended to effect, and which “substitutes” are introduced 
to occupy the discursive void left in its absence within a specific historical context.7 In turn, 
such a line of questioning can further inform and enrich our own efforts to gain a more 
precise understanding of a highly indeterminate category such as religion. 
The Complexity of Religion and the End of the Revolution in Modern China
While the abovementioned considerations are admittedly abstract and formulaic, I be-
lieve they can be helpful for orienting ourselves within the more specific problematic I 
will attempt to address in the rest of my paper, namely the position of Islam as a religion 
within modern Chinese historical materialist discourse. I will do so mainly by means of 
a limited case study of the writings of the Marxist historian Jamāl al-Dīn Bai Shouyi 白
寿彝 (1909–2000) on Hui identity. Additionally, I will try to show how Bai’s approach 
resonates with contemporary Chinese discourse on religion that is informed by a his-
torical materialist perspective. The rather cheeky remark “Nym Wales,” a pseudonym 
of the famous journalist Helen Foster Snow (1907–1997),8 made in the course of a 
conversation with Chinese Muslim recruits to the Red Army during the Long March, 
according to which the unlikely figure of Marx might find his way into the Islamic dec-
laration of faith (shahādah) made by every Muslim, serves as an epigraph to my paper 
for a reason: it can be seen a symbolising a complex social and discursive constellation 
in which the boundaries between the religious and the political are far from clear-cut.9 
Arguably, one of the most striking features of the fate of religion in modern China in 
general, and specifically in the period between the founding of the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) in 1949 and the beginning of the spectacular though still closely 
monitored return of the religious in the reform era, is that the communist assault on 
6 For a much more elaborate and metaphysically buttressed modern Confucian argument which runs 
in the same direction, see Tang (1958, 27–54, ch. 2): “family-consciousness and moral reason (家庭
意识与道德理性).
7 As the sociologist Andrew Abbott argues with reference to the evolution of the social sciences, 
a certain discourse must always try to find ways to accommodate the epistemic domain of their 
opponents or competitors once they have managed to discredit or simply outlive them. In his 
words, “any temporarily victorious pole of a dichotomy must comprehend subject matters that 
had been more comfortably comprehended by its erstwhile opponent […] defeating one’s enemies 
means taking up their burdens.” (Abbott 2001, 18)
8 Wife of Edgar Snow (1905–1972), author of Red Star over China. 
9 The most extensive and subtle historical analysis of the relation between Chinese Islam and 
communism to date is Cieciura (2014).
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religion as ideology and “feudal superstition” still left the backdoor open for revolu-
tionary politics to become a “substitute” for religion in its own right,10 albeit in a very 
un-Confucian and anti-Confucian manner probably not envisaged by Xie Youwei.11 
Paradoxically enough, the unmasking of ideology, which Marx saw as beginning with 
the criticism of religion, and as moving from “the criticism of Heaven” to a “criticism 
of the Earth” (Marx 1844), in turn became a means to legitimise the “organ of class 
domination” (Lenin 1917) known as the nation-state. In a classic case of the “return 
of the repressed,” the promise of liberation from religious illusions in itself became 
endowed with a quasi-eschatological potential. As Bourdieu famously observed, one 
of the main functions of the “religious field” is that its “theodicies” also serve as a form 
of “sociodicy” (Bourdieu 1991, 16), that is to say, as justifications for the preservation 
of a certain social order. “As above, so below,” one might be tempted say. 
In contemporary socialist China, the envisaged emancipation of human beings from 
the shackles of religious and other “idealist” representations of social reality has given 
way to a discourse of deferred liberation that no longer opens onto a horizon beyond 
the party-state, with market dynamics now being expected to somehow usher in the 
advent of socialism in the nearby future.12 In the reform era, a belief in the “scientific 
objectivity” and determining nature of economic laws came to replace a class-based 
conception of subjective revolutionary practice (see Misra 1998, 55–90).13 As such, 
the economy had to be allowed to work its magic, without any interference from 
10 Gamsa (2009) provides an excellent discussion of this issue.
11 Like many other thinkers associated with “New Confucianism,” Xie was highly critical of communism 
and historical materialism (see Xie 1946, 33–53). A more complex and ambiguous case is that of Liang 
Shuming 梁漱溟 (1893–1988), who is often identified as one of the first representatives of the New 
Confucian current in modern Chinese thought and, in contrast to exiles such as Xie, stayed on the 
mainland after the establishment of the PRC and continued to develop his ideas through a dialog 
with Marxism and Maoism. For Liang’s argument that morality serves as a replacement for religion in 
Chinese culture, see Liang (1947, 95–121). Although this is not the place for a more extensive discussion, 
the following quote from a text Liang started writing one year after the founding of the PRC, in which 
he reflects on the historical role and accomplishments of the Chinese Communist Party, can serve as 
a vivid illustration of the entanglement of the religious and the political in modern (revolutionary) 
China: “In a nutshell, the Communist Party unintentionally [!] managed to accomplish the following 
two things: just like a great religion, it managed to fill in the empty space resulting from China’s lack of 
religiosity. This is the first point. Secondly, in doing so, it introduced a form of collective life to replace 
the old ethical order […] Filling in the empty space left by the lack of religion was a precondition for ushering 
in a new form of communal existence.” (Liang 1951, 384, my italics)
12 The current president, Xi Jinping, has set the date for the realisation of the basis for “socialist 
modernisation” to somewhere between 2025 and 2035 (see Xinhua 2017).
13 This change is nicely symbolised by the title of an article by Hu Qiaomu 胡乔木 (1912–1992), who had 
previously served as secretary to Mao between 1941 and 1966: “Act According to Economic Laws: Speed 
up the Realization of the Four Modernizations” (Anzhao jingji guilü banshi, jiakuai shixian si ge xiandaihua 
按照经济规律办事, 加快实现四个现代化), Renmin ribao, 6 October 1978. (Misra 1998, 65)
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political superstition in the ability of individual leaders. The reforms initiated under 
Deng Xiaoping also involved setting clear limits to the tenure of government leaders14 
in order to avoid a recurrence of something like the Mao cult, which reached its peak 
during the Cultural Revolution. Perhaps this gesture can be read as an attempt to 
decouple revolutionary politics from its repressed “religious” dimension. At the same 
time, the overall loosening of ideological restraints and the depoliticisation of society 
allowed for a resurgence of “normal” religious activity among the populace and more 
unconstrained research on religion in the scholarly world. Notably, on the level of 
academic discourse as well as state policy (which in turn affect people’s everyday un-
derstanding), the ground for such a resurgence was prepared by positively redefining 
“religion” as an integral part of “culture,” the latter being approached as something 
inherently transcending class interests (see Mou 2003, 21; Tao 2010, 69–70).15 
Still, the particular “complexity” (fuzaxing 复杂性), one of the “five natures” (wu 
xing 五性)16 ascribed to the religious question as early as the 1950s to account for 
the persistence of religion in socialist China, a notion rehabilitated under Deng 
Xiaoping in a new government directive issued in 1982 known as “Document 
Number 19,” has left plenty of room open for theoretical ambiguity. More pre-
cisely, if religion should still be conceived of as the “opium of the people,” while 
class antagonisms are supposed to have already been abolished and the class 
struggle has ceased to be a political imperative, the question becomes precisely 
which problem it is responding to, and who is being “anaesthetised” against what, 
even when the anaesthetising function of religion is reinterpreted positively (see 
Luo 1991, 151–53).17 Perhaps it could be argued that it is only now, with the 
rupture between religion and politics in the ideological shift from subjective 
revolutionary practice to a celebration of a “permanent revolution” on the level 
of the productive forces, that “secularisation” as the privatisation of belief comes 
14 The term limits for the office of president were recently removed from the constitution by the 
National People’s Congress in March 2018, thus theoretically allowing the current president, Xi 
Jinping, to stay in power indefinitely. 
15 As Fenggang Yang notes: “Culture is an all-encompassing and esteemed term in the Chinese 
context […] when religion is studied as a cultural phenomenon, its ideological incorrectness 
becomes unimportant and its scientific incorrectness obscure, eliminating two key criticisms of 
religion by the militant and scientific atheisms respectively.” (Yang 2005, 27)
16 The other four being religion’s “mass nature” (qunzhongxing 群众性), “protracted nature” 
(changqixing 长期性), “ethnic nature” (minzuxing 民族性), and “international nature” (guojixing 
国际性). The notion of the “five natures” of religion was first formulated by Li Weihan 李维汉 
(1896–1984), the first director of the Central Party School. (see Tao 2010, 64)
17 On the historical reception of Marx’s famous “opium” quote, see Tao (2010). As Tao notes, the 
historical memory of the Opium Wars explains why “the metaphor of opium and religion, especially 
with respect to Christianity, had special implications for the Chinese people, for whom opium was 
viewed not only as a drug but as a source of national humiliation.” (ibid., 61)
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into full swing.18 Needless to say, the full complexity of this problem cannot be 
done justice to in this short text. However, if people supposedly “no longer turn 
to religion for comfort because of suffering caused by class oppression and ex-
ploitation” (Luo 1991, 154), it seems logical to assume that the soothing function 
of religion has to be moved to the domain of individual subjective interiority. 
The so-called “mass nature” (qunzhongxing 群众性) of religion thus refers not 
so much to the importance of religion (and arguably, of ideology in general) 
for a social collective such as the working class, but rather to the sheer num-
ber of individual believers. Additionally, the desired overlap between religious 
convictions and the residual ideological requirements of Chinese socialism can 
now be defined in purely instrumental and pragmatic terms.19 This individualistic 
orientation could explain the emphasis placed on ambiguous and psychologis-
tic terms such “perplexion” (困扰) (Dai and Peng 2000, 313) and the putative 
need for “psychological attunement” (心理调适) (ibid., 323) in Chinese Marxist 
discussions on the function of religion in the post-revolutionary era. Instead of 
counting as “the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering” 
(Marx 1844), religion now appears as the concern of private individuals in rela-
tive abstraction from a social context which is supposed to no longer give rise to 
any need for the illusions and false comfort of the religious opioid. 
At the same time however, it is clear that the “complexity” of the religious question in 
post-revolutionary in China, specifically in the case of Islam, is closely related to what 
is known as its “ethnic nature” (minzuxing 民族性), which in turn is tied up with in-
ternational relations, the legitimacy of the party, territorial integrity, and domestic 
security.20 In other words, lingering in the background there remains a sometimes 
almost paranoid awareness of the immense ideological power of religion and of the 
risks of allowing it to flourish, even within a well-defined institutional framework 
18 José Casanova (2006, 7) distinguishes between secularization as 1) “the decline of beliefs and 
practices in modern societies,” 2) “the privatisation of religion,” and 3) “the differentiation of the 
secular spheres (state, economy, science), usually understood as the ‘emancipation’ from religious 
institutions and norms.”
19 As He Yanji bluntly states: “What does it matter if religious believers do not understand the norms 
of socialist morality from the Communist viewpoint, when their behaviour conforms with the 
requirements of socialist material and spiritual civilisation, even though it is based on Islamic 
teachings and tradition?” (He 1991, 231)
20 This does not mean that Islam is necessarily seen as more threatening than religions that are 
not approached in “ethnic” but rather universalist terms such as Christianity. As Maja Veselič 
(2013, 101) points out: “Although the global discourse of the war on terrorism is now regularly 
instrumentalised by the Chinese government to justify religious and political repression in Xinjiang, 
Islam is generally viewed with less suspicion than Christianity due to the anti-Western-imperialist 
rhetoric and sentiments China shares with many Muslim majority countries, as well as to the lack 
of Islam’s political influence in more recent historical periods.” 
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of loyalty to the party and the state. The current unprecedented crackdown on the 
predominantly Muslim Uyghur population in the Western border province of Xin-
jiang shows that the return of religion to postrevolutionary China has been all but 
unconditional, with an estimated 1 million Uyghurs being subjected to “transforma-
tion through education” (jiaoyu zhuanhua 教育转化) in extra-legal internment fa-
cilities (see Zenz 2018 for a detailed report). In a Marxist textbook on the sociology 
of religion dating back almost two decades, Dai Kangsheng 戴康生 (1937–2003) 
and Peng Yao 彭耀 (b. 1937) already cautioned that every single one of the positive 
functions associated with the pharmakon religion can at the same time be identified 
as a potential source of risk, the relatively harmless need for “religious identity” for 
example harbouring the potential to lead to “narrow nationalism,” extremism, and 
separatism (see Dai and Peng 2000, 320–28). As the Marxist scholar Jin Ze 金泽 (b. 
1954) dramatically predicts, echoing Jiang Zemin’s observation that religion might 
outlast the existence of classes and nations (see Tao 2010, 59–60): 
Religious questions––and in particular the emergencies and mass inci-
dents (突发事件和群发事件) caused by such questions––will seriously un-
dermine social development in most cases, and the people affected will 
far outnumber the believers […] Inasmuch as religion can influence and 
interact with an entire society, and such influence and interactions are even 
more powerful than regime change and social transformation, religion should 
be given particular prominence when a society draws up its cultural blue-
print. ( Jin 2014, 85, my italics) 
No wonder then that in contemporary China, social protest which draws on existing 
forms of religious organisation and association has to masquerade as what Marx 
called a “criticism of the Earth” which can be articulated in purely economic terms 
devoid of more “transcendent” political aspirations (see Luo and Andreas 2016, 479).
Bai Shouyi and Hui Identity: Revolution,  
Nationalism, and the Indeterminacy of the Religious
It is crucial at this point to emphasise that the categories of ethnicity and race sub-
stantially complicate any consideration of the relation between religion and politics 
in modern China, particularly in the case of Chinese Islam and Muslim identity. 
Maja Veselič aptly characterises the ethno-religious identity of Chinese Muslim 
minorities such as the Hui as a “labyrinth” (Veselič 2013, 104–6). If the in itself al-
ready highly fluid category of “religion” is approached as the defining characteristic 
of the ethnic identity of certain groups, its status becomes even more ambiguous 
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and unstable, as something divided between the ethereal sphere of “belief ” and 
more tangible or material aspects such as language, ritual, custom, dress, and skin 
colour.21 In Marxist terms, this means that the domain of the religious cannot be 
easily dismissed as a transitory epiphenomenon exclusively located on the level of 
the “superstructure,” but remains suspended between “Heaven” and “Earth” for as 
long as it is still allowed to exist. This indeterminate position of religion quickly be-
comes apparent if we turn to the specific case of the Marxist historian Bai Shouyi. 
Bai’s life spans almost the entire twentieth century. He was born in 1909 in Kaifeng 
(Henan Province) and passed away in Beijing in 2000 after a long and active career in 
which he held various academic positions, most notably as head of the History Depart-
ment at Beijing Normal University. Bai also served in a number of official capacities, 
such as vice-president of the Islamic Association of China (Zhongguo yisilanjiao xiehui 
中国伊斯兰教协会), the official representative body for Chinese Muslims founded 
in 1953. Bai was thus clearly an establishment intellectual, who combined academic 
aspirations with political responsibilities.22 As most readers probably already noticed in 
the above, Bai also had an Islamic name (jiaoming 教名, or jingming 经名, “scripture/
Quranic name”), Jamāl al-Dīn (Zhemaluding 哲玛鲁丁 in Chinese). To avoid any mis-
understanding, by most accounts, most importantly his own, Bai was not a practicing 
Muslim and the fact that he bore this name was probably simply due to the fact that he 
was born into a Hui family. To the best of my knowledge at least, Bai never signed any 
of his writings as “Jamāl al-Dīn.” There is also a certain anachronism in the statement 
that Bai was born as a Hui, since the Hui, just like the other nine “ethnic minorities” 
(shaoshu minzu 少数民族) in present-day China who are classified as followers of Is-
lam, were only officially recognised as a separate “nationality” (minzu 民族)23 by the 
state following a massive government-orchestrated ethnic classification project during 
the 1950s, something for which the way had already been paved during the Yan’an 
21 Notably, while party cadres are all assumed to be “scientific materialists and atheists,” that is to 
say, not to belong to any religious denomination, an exception is made for members of an ethnic 
minority (see Chan 2005, 90). 
22 For more detailed biographical information, see Bartke (1997, 1: 10), Liu (2011), and Chérif-
Chebbi (2015). 
23 This highly charged and ambiguous term can also be translated as “ethnic group” or even simply “people” 
or “nation,” as is the case in the common expression Zhonghua minzu 中华民族, “the Chinese people,” 
“the people(s) of China,” or “the Chinese nation.” The main problem with the term minzu is that it 
has ethnic, territorial, and political aspects, which are not always easy to separate analytically. Thus 
the Chinese “nation” (minzu) can be said to include a variety of different minzu 民族, ethnic groups, 
or “nationalities” in the more traditional Marxist phraseology. In what follows, I will use the term 
“nationality” with reference to Marxist discourse in particular, while employing the now more commonly 
used word “ethnic group” as a more neutral descriptive category. Since the secondary literature is not 
always consistent in this respect, the reader must allow for the appearance of variants such as “minority 
nationalities,” terms which are located in the same semantic sphere as minzu. 
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period (see Gladney 1998, 121; Cieciura 2014).24 The complex history of how the term 
hui 回 (or more archaically, huihui 回回) changed from a designation for all Chinese 
Muslims that had been in use since the Yuan period (1279–1368) (see Bai 1943, 19) 
to a name for one of a number of Muslim minorities cannot be treated in the context 
of this short article.25 In any case, by his own admission, it was only in 1937 with the 
outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War and the attempts by Japan dating back to 
the early 1930s to win over Chinese Muslims through strategic promises of greater 
24 Numbering almost 11 million people and spread across the entire territory of the People’s Republic 
(with substantial concentrations in Northwestern China) the Chinese-speaking Hui are the largest of 
the ten ethnic minority groups in present-day China identified as Muslim (of a total of 23 million). 
The other nine Muslim minorities (Uyghur, Dongxiang, Salar, Kazak, Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Tajik, Bonan, 
and Tatar) speak a variety of non-Sinitic languages and are mostly concentrated in specific geographic 
areas, the most well-known undoubtedly being the Uyghurs in the Western border province of Xinjiang. 
By contrast, vestimentary habits such as white skullcaps for men and veils for women aside, the only 
“visible” characteristic of the Hui which sets them apart from the Han majority is their assumed 
common faith in Islam and their observation of the ritual practices and religious obligations which 
come with being a Muslim (most notably abstaining from the consumption of pork and alcohol). This 
is why the Hui are sometimes inaccurately referred to as “Chinese Muslims,” which is obviously a 
misnomer, since other Muslim minorities in the People’ Republic are no less “Chinese” than their Hui 
fellow believers (Gladney 2008, 182). On the other hand, this shows to what extent perceived (physical, 
cultural) proximity to the Han majority is handled as a marker of “Chineseness.” If one pushes this 
logic to the extreme, the “Chineseness” of the Hui becomes something like a “redemptive quality” for 
their being Muslim: “Hui culture is a combination of two great traditions: the Chinese and the Islamic. 
The Chinese element of the Hui culture decided the Hui loyalty to China. Examples of their loyalty were 
not only in the Republican era, but also in dynastic times. The Hui, scattering across China, are bound 
to the Chinese soil and to China’s national fate. In fact, the Hui people have strong ‘master-hood’ 
consciousness as Chinese people, or as a group of people in China, in case the term ‘Chinese’ might lead to 
any misinterpretation. This characteristic seems outstanding in comparison with Islamic ethnic minorities in 
some other countries.” (Lei 2012, 168, emphasis added). That the Hui are distinguished as an ethnicity 
on the basis of their faith alone is remarkable given the fact that religious affiliation is not recorded in 
the official census (Gladney 2008, 181), and is not used as a sole criterion for distinguishing one ethnic 
group from another. The Hui are thus something of a theoretical anomaly within the ethnopolitics 
of the Chinese Marxist universe (see Gong 2006, 43–44). The ensuing ambiguity of Hui identity in 
contemporary China is vividly illustrated by Lesley Turnbull (2016), who conducted anthropological 
fieldwork in the city of Kunming and rural Shadian (both in Yunnan Province) and describes a marked 
opposition between Hui women for whom only religious conviction and practice matters to their 
identity as Hui on the one hand, and those who argue that being Hui is a matter of descent and lineage 
and thus has little or nothing to do with Islam as a religion. As one her interlocutors who falls into 
the latter category put it revealingly: “We Huizu have a genetic link to the Qur’an, so we are Muslims 
whether or not we practice the teachings of Islam” (Turnbull 2016, 129, my italics). Between these two 
extremes, it is of course possible to find a lot less clear-cut combinations of the ethnic and religious 
dimension of the term hui in everyday communication. (see Veselič 2013, 105) 
25 See Gladney (1991, 65–98), Cieciura (2016), and Chen (2017) for detailed accounts. The semantic 
indeterminacy of the term hui becomes even more obvious if we consider the fact that one 
Republican-era author, Chen Jie 陈捷 (dates unknown), used the term huijiao minzu 回教民族 to 
refer to all followers of Islam across the globe. (see Chen 1933)
Asian Studies VII (XXIII), 1 (2019), pp. 173–199
AS_2019_1_FINAL.indd   183 31.1.2019   10:48:39
184
autonomy (along the lines of an “independent” Manchuria)26 that Bai began to pay 
any real attention to the problem of the position of Islam in the Chinese Republic and, 
presumably, to his own identity as a Hui.27 Bai’s concern for this problem was thus, at 
least initially, the direct result of what he saw as the enormous strategic and ideological 
importance of the Muslim peoples of China for safeguarding the territorial integrity of 
the Republic and resisting Japanese imperialism (see Bai 2001c, 81).28
I have only found one somewhat obscure source which claims that Bai Shouyi was 
actually a devout believer in Islam and that his overt and consistent commitment 
to Marxism and historical materialism was simply a cover allowing him to quiet-
ly continue his scholarly work after the establishment of the PRC (Chang 1981, 
36). However, like many other historians, a risky profession in a highly politicised 
society, Bai was subjected to harsh criticism during the Cultural Revolution, but 
somehow managed to survive these turbulent years relatively unscathed. That the 
author of the source in question, the scholar Haji Yusuf Chang (Chinese name 
Zhang Zhaoli 张兆理, dates unknown),29 was a personal acquaintance of Bai argu-
ably lends some credence to this claim. However, what is perhaps more interesting 
is the rhetorical strategy Chang uses to justify his portrayal of Bai Shouyi as a 
pious Muslim operating under the cover of the Marxist creed. More specifically, in 
Chang’s view, Bai’s adoption of the Marxist orthodoxy should be seen as part of an 
age-old defensive tactic used by Chinese Muslims to insulate themselves against 
external threats in times of danger (see ibid., 34). As Chang writes in an earlier text: 
All the Chinese Muslim scholars, whether of the past or the present, 
have contrived to defend Islam by using “syncretism” as a negative weap-
on in facing whatever ideology or influence threatened them under any 
26 Promises were made for the creation of a “Muslim nation” (huihuiguo 回回国) within the Greater 
East-Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere” of the Japanese empire (see Lei 2012, 143–46). Cieciura (2016, 
127) surmises that the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 probably coincided with the 
emergence of the idea that the Hui formed a separate nationality (distinct from the Han majority 
as well as other Muslim minorities, most notably the Uyghurs).
27 Bai had already devoted two empirically oriented articles to the history of Islam in China, namely 
“Zhongguo huijiao shiliao jilu 中国回教史料编辑录 (Compilation of Historical Materials on 
Islam in China)” from 1935 and “Cong Daluosi zhanyi shuodao Zhongguo Yisilan zui zao de 
wenhua jilu 从怛罗斯战役说到中国伊斯兰最早的记录 (An Account of the Earliest Records of 
Islam in China in the Context of the Battle of Talas)” from 1936.
28 Bai was a member of the ethnographic expedition into Northwest China launched by the historian 
Gu Jiegang 顾颉刚 (1893–1980), whose journal Yugong 禹贡 devoted two special issues to the topic 
of Islam in China. For a description of Bai’s impressions during this journey, see Bai (2001, 584–623). 
29 Chang was one of the participants in a “goodwill mission” organised by the “Chinese Muslim 
National Salvation Association” (Zhongguo huimin jiuguo xiehui 中国回民救过协会) during the 
Second World War in an effort to counter similar diplomatic propaganda initiatives undertaken by 
the Japanese (see Lei 2012, 151).
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circumstances. So far, it has proven a very successful weapon. Unlike Islam, 
Buddhism, once syncretised with Confucianism or Taoism, has its original 
doctrines fundamentally changed or supplanted. (Chang 1960, 21)
Within this line of reasoning, Bai Shouyi’s “syncretistic” adoption of historical 
materialism can be placed on a par with the elaborate usage of (Neo-)Confu-
cian concepts to expound and defend the Islamic doctrine proposed by Muslim 
thinkers from the late Ming and Qing period, who are generally referred to as 
huiru 回儒, or “Islamic Confucians.” The extensive corpus of texts they pro-
duced is collectively called the Han kitāb (Han ketabu 汉克塔布 in Chinese), 
an expression combining the words “Chinese” (Han) and the Arabic word for 
“book” (see Benite (2005) for a detailed historical study). In very general terms, 
these Sino-Islamic philosophico-religious texts made strong normative claims 
for the status of Islam as a jiao 教 or “teaching” endowed with the potential for 
subjective self-cultivation as well as socio-political transformation. As such, a 
basic idea motivating the huiru was that the Islamic teaching and way of life 
could exist side by side with and even reinforce established Confucian ideals of 
spiritual self-improvement and political governance. Additionally, according to 
Chang, the ideas developed in the literature of the Han kitāb remained funda-
mentally unaffected by the Confucian terminology they adopted. 
It is certainly questionable whether any religious or philosophical doctrine can 
remain immune to the conceptual vocabulary and grammar it uses to articulate 
a certain worldview. The ideological encounter between Marxist materialism and 
Islam in modern Chinese history seems improbable enough in itself, although 
we would be mistaken to dismiss such an “unholy alliance” (Fowkes and Gökay 
2009) purely on the basis of an abstract demand for conceptual consistency. In 
any case, if we turn our attention to Bai Shouyi’s embrace of Marxism, we clearly 
find the exact opposite from the hermeneutical outlook Chang ascribes to the 
Han kitāb authors. Bai’s historical materialist analysis of the doctrinal, social, and 
cultural development of Islam in China could no longer, either logically or on 
a practical level, claim to derive its normative validity from Islamic sources of 
authority such as the Qur’an and Hadith. Additionally, while it may have been 
tempting to buttress the “Chineseness” of Islam by drawing on the existence of a 
rich huiru tradition, such a strategy had to confront the fact that Confucianism 
had meanwhile become discredited as a “feudal” impediment to modernisation. 
Consequently, any transformation of the Islamic teachings into a vehicle for the 
national liberation and self-determination of China would have to be coupled with 
an effort to distance Sino-Islamic traditions from Confucianism as a marker of 
“Chineseness,” or, alternatively, a radical redefinition of the status of Confucianism 
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as a “teaching.” In short, the “terms of agreement” and compatibility between China 
and Islam had changed drastically. In effect, Marxist inclusions of the Han kitāb 
authors into the historical tradition of Chinese Islam thus generally occur on a 
rather indeterminate level, in which abstraction is made from the specific content of 
their religious philosophy in order to turn the latter into intellectual expressions of 
exemplary “localisation” (i.e. “Sinicisation”) (see Jin 2017, 15) and precursors to the 
effective integration of Hui identity and nationalism.
In other words, Muslims and other “ethnic minorities” in modern China had to 
find a way of positioning themselves in relation to China as a new nation-state 
and to nationalism as the sine qua non of any performative political doctrine (see 
Aubin 2006), an effort that required much more than the ritual invocation of a 
(most likely apocryphal) saying attributed to the Prophet, according to which 
“love of the motherland is an article of faith” (hubb al-watan min al-īmān). The 
connection between religion and ethnicity became an unavoidable problem, one 
ultimately not “resolved” through academic discussion, but rather through the 
ethnopolitics of the Chinese communist state. Arguably, this connection was 
nowhere as complex as in the case of the nationality to which Bai belonged, 
the Hui, whose only defining characteristic vis-à-vis the Han, namely being 
Muslim, belongs to their religious “superstructure.”30 Normally, Chinese Marxist 
theoreticians and anthropologists defined a nationality (minzu) by means of a 
whole set of material, cultural, linguistic, and psychological elements, which are 
assumed to converge in a certain nationality as a discrete carrier of historical 
experiences. In contemporary Chinese Marxist literature, the classical point of 
reference in this respect still seems to be Joseph Stalin’s “Marxism and the Na-
tional Question” from 1913. In this influential tract, Stalin identified four crite-
ria which define a nationality: common language, common territory, common 
economic life, and a common psychological makeup. That the Chinese-speaking 
Hui, who were and still are spread across the entire territory of the PRC and 
whose “economic life” can hardly be separated from that of the Han majority, 
only share a “common psychological makeup,” that is to say, all believe in Islam, 
makes their status as a separate nationality questionable, or at least highly unsta-
ble. However, as the Marxist scholar Gong Xuezeng 龚学增 (b. 1945)31 writes in 
30 See footnote 25 above. 
31 Gong served as president of the “Teaching and Research Office on Theories of Ethnicity and 
Religion” (中共中央党校民族与宗教理论教研室), one of the six offices which fall under the 
“Teaching and Research Department for Scientific Socialism” (Kexue shehuizhuyi jiaoyanbu 科学社
会主义教研部) at the Central Party School in Beijing, between 1991 and 2004. The name of this 
research institute in itself points to the strong and historically rooted connection between religious 
identity and ethnicity in modern China, seeing how the party institutionally treats them as part of 
the same domain of knowledge.
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a text discussing the nexus between ethnicity and religion, there are exceptions 
to the general rule described by the Stalinist criteria: 
Within specific historical conditions, the spread and development of 
a certain type of communal religion can even exert a determining in-
fluence on the formation of a nationality (minzu). In this respect, the 
formation of the Hui nationality in our country is a typical example. 
Historically speaking, the Hui nationality is a nationality with many 
ethnic sources (回族是一个多族源的民族). But in their formation, the 
only commonality of the Hui was their belief in Islam. (Gong 2006, 40)
Bai Shouyi had already tried to argue from within the restrictive context of 
Stalin’s scheme that the three “material” criteria (common language, territo-
ry, economic life) for nationality are subordinate to the fourth more subjective 
and “spiritual” dimension of a “common psychological makeup,” which he de-
scribed by means of the term “national/ethnic consciousness” (minzu yishi 民族
意识); that is to say, a nationality’s self-recognition and self-identification (see 
Bai 1991, 5–6). While he does not say so explicitly, Bai seems to assume that 
that the normal relation of dominance between the material and mental is to 
some extent upset or even reversed in the case of the Hui, as an ethnic group 
officially only defined by its religion. He notes that “ideas and consciousness are 
reflections of social existence (ibid., 6),” but adds that the reverse dynamic, of 
the impact of consciousness upon social existence, is often neglected, although 
it plays a crucial role in understanding the history of the nation-state and its 
different, but all equally Chinese, “nationalities.”32
32 Similarly, in a work from 1957 published a few years after Bai’s The Righteous Uprisings of the 
Hui People, Lin Gan 林幹 (1916–2017), a scholar specialised in history of the Xiongnu, argued 
that the ethnic contradictions between Manchu and Hui, which he saw as having given rise 
to the rebellions of the 19th century, far surpassed those between classes in late Qing society 
(Lin 1957, 69). At the same time however, Lin analysed factional struggles between Chinese 
Muslims belonging to different Sufi orders (menhuan 门宦) as religious expressions of class 
conflict (cf. Bai 2001d, 150–56). He thus asserted the primacy of the socio-economic within one 
of the two opposing parties in a broader social antagonism where the ethnic dimension prevails. 
Additionally, Lin discerned the beginnings of stronger social divisions within the Hui as a people 
during this period, particularly a nascent division between the land-owning classes (consolidated 
in the menhuan system) on the one hand and the labouring peasant population on the other, 
germinal intra-ethnic class divisions which were covered over by the larger interethnic conflict 
between Hui and Manchu. (ibid., 71) Within this line of reasoning caught between ethnic and 
“material,” class-based poles of analysis, Lin ultimately defers to the primacy of the economy 
in arguing that the Hui uprisings remained unsuccessful because of the absence of a “new class 
representative of the advanced forces of production,” i.e. the industrial proletariat, which still had 
to come into being. 
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In more general terms, the ethnic minorities of the current day PRC are still often 
assumed to be more heavily influenced and in a sense defined by their religious 
convictions and customs than the supposedly a-religious, secular, and thus more 
“modern” Han majority. This would seem to suggest that the historical materi-
alist dictum according to which the “base determines the superstructure” only 
applies to those members of the nation with the most advanced “superstructure,” 
a curious and targeted inversion of the basic logic of dialectical materialism. Eth-
nic minorities such as the Hui on the other hand are not so much perceived 
and described in terms of their material or social conditions of existence, but are 
rather seen as being overdetermined by the religious component of their social 
“superstructure.” This strategic suspension of the primacy of the material in turn 
is crucial for maintaining national unity. As Luo Zhufeng 罗竹风 (1911–1996)33 
for example argued:
The proportion of religious believers among the national minorities 
ranges from fairly high to very high, while in some groups virtually 
every person is a religious believer––clearly a situation with a specific 
“mass nature.” Religious beliefs, minority group feelings, and customs 
are integrated into an organic whole among these national minorities. 
Religion sets the norms for their core culture and morality [...] We 
must respect and take seriously their religious beliefs, or else it will af-
fect the unity of the national minorities [with the nation]. (Luo 1991, 
10–11)34
A very similar line of reasoning is put forward by another Marxist thinker, Zhuo 
Xinping 卓新平 (b. 1955), who makes the routine argument that this dominating 
influence of religion on the life and mentality of ethnic minorities corresponds to 
a more primitive stage of social development: 
In primitive society, religion and culture were united seamlessly. Primi-
tive culture is none other than a type of religious culture. Every cultural 
33 Luo was the first Marxist theoretician to give a positive twist to the “opium” metaphor for religion 
and attempt to disentangle a “Marxist” conception of religion from the negative overtones of this 
metaphor (see Tao 2010, 66–69).
34 Cf. Luo 1991, 34: “Although the religions of the Han Chinese are a component of their traditional 
culture, they are not so closely combined with culture, customs, and psychology as among the 
minority nationalities. Third, religion plays a large social function. Religion, among the minority 
nationalities, always plays an integral role in traditional spiritual civilisation [...] The social function 
of religion among the Han Chinese is far less important than it is for people of ethnic minorities.”
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activity in primitive society is a religious activity.35 It is only during its 
later development that human society creates numerous relatively inde-
pendent cultural fields that are not subordinated to religion but are free 
from religious domination. Precisely because of this, religion is still preserved 
as both a way of ethnic life and a cultural characteristic among many nations 
or nationalities. (Zhuo 2014, 61, emphasis added)
As I already indicated, the problem of the relation between ethnicity and religion, 
which is obviously tied up with concerns over national unity, occupied a central 
position in the work of Bai Shouyi. Bai is probably best known for his role as the 
leading editor of the monumental 22-volume volume Comprehensive History of Chi-
na (Zhongguo tongshi 中国通史), which was completed in 1999 after a decade-long 
collective effort of almost 500 individual authors (including 28 different editors), 
and covers the entire period stretching from remote antiquity to the founding of 
the People’s Republic. Apart from overseeing the entire project, Bai himself was in 
charge of the composition of the first volume, which serves as a more theoretical 
introduction to the Comprehensive History as a whole. Revealingly enough, the first 
chapter of this book focuses on the idea that China is a “unified multi-ethnic state” 
(tongyi de duominzu guojia 统一的多民族国家) (Bai 2004, 1–98), an idea which 
would seem to be indebted to Fei Xiaotong’s 费孝通 (1910–2005) characterisation 
of the Chinese people as being defined by a “structure of unity within diversity” 
(duoyuan yiti geju 多元一体格局) (Fei 1989). In an earlier and more concise text 
in which he already outlined this concept (Bai 1991), Bai argued that a history of 
China should compromise the historical trajectory of all its minorities and guard 
itself against “Han chauvinism.” The unity of the Chinese people cannot be seen 
as a transhistorical and unchanging given, but rather required a long process of 
historical development before finally crystallising into a dialectical unity in which 
difference is preserved within the modern socialist nation-state. The latter is thus 
the historical form in which ethnic minority groups can come into their own as a 
people whose “hyphenated” (i.e., “Sino-Islamic,” see Lipman 1996) identity is not 
35 In a similar vein, Qin Huibin 秦惠彬 (b. 1940) speaks of the “phenomenon of the consubstantiality 
of religion and ethnicity (教族一体现象)” with reference to Islam in China (Qin 1996, 18). Thus, 
for Qin, unlike Buddhism, which he sees as an integral part of Chinese intellectual history, the 
historical development of Islam in China is to be located entirely on the level of social history. In 
effect, for Qin, Chinese Islam constitutes an anomalous exception to the “normal” laws of religious 
development: “It was completely determined by kinship relations and regional geographical 
relations. Generally speaking, the internal development of a religion should determine the 
development of its vehicle (zaiti 载体) [of transmission, i.e. a certain ethnicity]. But in the case 
of Chinese Islam, we find the exact opposite, namely that the vehicle determined its religious 
content.” (Qin 1998, 84)
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a sign of duplicity or ambiguity, but of dialectical reconciliation (Bai 2004, 98).36 In 
what is clearly a tautological argument, Bai identifies the Chinese nation not as a 
strictly circumscribed geographical area, but rather as “comprising the sphere of ac-
tivity of the various Chinese nationalities throughout history within the boundaries 
[of China]” (包含境内各民族在历史上活动的范围) (Bai 1981, 4; cf. Bai 2001a).
In affirming the historically constituted unity of the Chinese people and the 
role played by Muslim minorities in Chinese history, Bai had already started ar-
guing in the 1950s that a clear distinction should be drawn and upheld between 
ethnicity and religion. More precisely, he criticised the then prevalent practice 
of referring to all Muslims in China as Hui and to Islam as huijiao 回教, a prac-
tice which conflates the Hui as a distinct nationality with the entire Muslim 
population of China. Bai maintained that Islam is a world religion which should 
be rendered as yisilanjiao 伊斯兰教 in Chinese, not as huijiao, since this gives 
the mistaken impression that Islam is the belief system of the Hui alone, or that 
all Chinese Muslims are ethnically Hui (see Bai 2001d, 100–5). In June 1956, 
the State Council officially ratified Bai’s line of reasoning by issuing a decision 
to officially abandon the usage of huijiao in favour of yisilanjiao to refer to Islam 
(Gladney 1998, 122; Gladney 2008, 180–81; Cieciura 2014, 16). Arguably, Bai’s 
insistence that the Muslim population of China historically consisted of differ-
ent nationalities such as the Hui serves the purpose of minimising the impact 
of “religion” on the historical existence and development of China’s Muslim 
minorities. In the case of the Hui, this remains a paradoxical endeavour, since 
they are only defined by their common belief in Islam and are usually not seen 
as conforming to the other three Stalinist criteria. Bai’s somewhat makeshift 
solution consists in sublating the religious dimension of Hui identity into the 
more indeterminate criterion of what he calls “national consciousness,” a notion 
36 By contrast, back in 1929, the philosopher Li Da 李达 (1890–1966), one of the founders of the 
Chinese Communist Party, still identified the nation-state as an impediment to the complete 
unfolding of the productive forces. He saw the existence of distinct nations and ethnic groups as 
being restricted to the historical horizon of capitalism (see Li 1929). Invoking the authority of 
Lenin and Stalin, another famous Marxist historian, Jian Bozan 翦伯赞 (1898–1968), himself 
of Uyghur descent, drew a distinction between “assimilation” (tonghua 同化) and “amalgamation” 
or “fusion” (ronghe 融合), the former referring to how smaller nationalities with less developed 
“productive forces” are assimilated into the more advanced majority (throughout Chinese history, 
the Han), a process conditioned by the existence of classes, while the latter designates a “fusion on 
equal terms and a unity of a higher level between all peoples arrived at on the basis of international 
communism,” ushering in the emergence of “a new people that never existed before.” ( Jian 1962, 
92) That being said, Jian insisted that the practical logistics of social redemption through class 
struggle require a certain degree of non-coercive and non-violent “assimilation” in order to lead 
“backwards” nationalities in the right direction of historical and civilizational development, thus 
allowing them to “set out for the Yellow River basin as the cradle of Han Culture.” (ibid., 96)
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asserted over and against the more tangible Stalinist criteria for what counts as 
a separate nationality. As such, Chinese Muslim minorities can only play their 
part in the grand narrative of the Chinese people as a historically develop-
ing dialectical unity as nationalities, not as believers in a distinct, non-Chinese 
religion, so that the question concerning the ultimate marker of their ethnic 
identity (from the perspective of the state, religion) is bracketed. Instead, at-
tention is shifted to a sense of belonging which does not violate the historical 
materialist principle according to which social existence determines thought. 
Historical materialism thus leaves room open for the autonomy of conscious-
ness, but only in its “national” and not its “religious” form. This allows Bai to 
argue for a more or less seamless continuity between “patriotic education” and 
the endeavour of gaining insight into the history of China’s ethnic minorities, 
a history in which “nationalities” are portrayed as always already committed to 
building and strengthening the nation (see Bai 2001b). In this sense, the Hui 
qualify as an integral part of Chinese history because they are one of its many 
ethnic groups, “contributing”37 to the larger historical trajectory of the dialecti-
cal unity of the nation, not because their religion was somehow compatible with 
or even conductive to the Confucian normative and institutional order, as the 
Han kitāb authors had previously argued. Bai makes this abundantly clear with 
reference to the Hui in the following quote from The Rebirth of the Hui People 
(Huihui minzu de xinsheng 回回民族的新生), where the notion of the Hui’s 
“psychological makeup” becomes almost completely detached from the domain 
of the religious: 
What determined the psychological makeup of the Hui people was not 
their religious belief, but rather their history as a nationality and their condi-
tions of existence. […] The most salient characteristic of the psychological 
makeup of the Hui people as a nationality is that they rally together to 
help each other and their courageous fighting spirit. While it cannot be 
denied that this characteristic was influenced by religion, it was primarily 
the result of a long [experience of ] repression and slaughter and of par-
ticularly harsh conditions of existence. (Bai 2001d, 104)
Unlike some contemporary Chinese scholars, Bai does not see Hui identity as 
being overdetermined by religion. His insistence on the distinctive “fighting 
spirit” of the Hui and their experience of particular hardships throughout Chi-
nese history also makes it clear where his narrative of the history of Islam in 
37 For the telling case of how the famous Chinese Muslim explorer Zheng He 郑和 (1371–1433) 
became presented as an “ethnic hero,” see Aubin (2005).
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China starts out from.38 More specifically, Bai devoted a lot of scholarly atten-
tion to a series of uprisings of Muslim minorities which took place during the 
second half of 19th century in the wake of the Taiping Rebellion (see Bai 1962, 
9). He oversaw the compilation of a four-volume series of historical documents 
related to these events entitled The Righteous Uprisings of the Hui people (Hu-
imin qiyi 回民起义), published in 1952.39 Rather unsurprisingly, Bai Shouyi’s 
orthodox Marxist outlook leads him to read these uprisings as ultimately being 
grounded in class contradictions, which in turn gave rise to ethnic tensions. As 
such, he is adamant that they were not instances of religious war. Rather, these 
ethnic conflicts were a “form” (xingshi 形式) (Bai 2001d, 148–49; Bai 1952, 
303) in which class struggle manifested itself in the specific context of the so-
cial conflicts besetting the border regions of late Qing China. In this sense, the 
Marxist rhetoric of class struggle allows the Hui to figure as protagonists in the 
history of the Chinese nation and the historical struggle of the Chinese people 
against feudal oppression: “the Hui are a people who were always controlled by 
more developed and governing ethnicities, they are a people who [belong to a 
phase in history where] the feudalist system had not yet come to an end” (Bai 
2001d, 116). Paradoxically enough, the “national consciousness” which Bai puts 
forward as being distinctive of the Hui as a nationality at the same time unites 
them with the Han majority, the latter qualifying as the “dominant nationality” 
(zhuti minzu 主体民族) or true  “subject” (zhuti 主体) and “stabilising force” of 
Chinese history (see Bai 1981, 7–9). In the same manner that the proletariat 
qualifies as the “universal class” in Marxist thought, the Hui are presented as 
a people who embody the feudal class oppression assumed to be borne by the 
entire populace before the communist liberation of China and whose interests 
coincide with the revolutionary forces across different ethnic groups throughout 
Chinese history as a whole (see Bai 2001d, 162). 
38 Bai described the history of the Hui as that of a “fighting people” (zhandou de minzu 战斗的民族) 
(see Bai 2001d, 118–45).
39 Bai’s decision to devote so much importance to the collection and classification of historical 
data was enough to draw criticism from some of his colleagues, who argued that he did not pay 
enough attention to the fact that these uprisings were clear instances of class struggle (Ching 
2010, 67, 80). The first of these uprisings was the so-called Panthay Rebellion, which took place 
in Yunnan between 1856 and 1873 and led to the temporary establishment of a sultanate with 
its capital located in Dali 大理. Another major uprising led by Yaqub Beg occurred in Northwest 
and West China between 1864 and 1877 is nowadays referred to as the Dungan Revolt. These 
uprisings elicited a violent backlash from the Qing court, resulting in an estimated 50 to 85% 
reduction of the Muslim population in certain areas, the result of the social suffering caused 
by war as well as active ethnic cleansing. The memory of the enormous loss human life during 
these events still persists to this day among certain Chinese Muslim communities (see Armijo-
Hussein 2001).
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Conclusion
In Bai Shouyi’s writings, the Hui as a people can become a revolutionary subject 
of history through this strange overlap between their ethnic (Hui) and national 
(Chinese) identities, an overlap that occurs not because––, but in spite of––their 
religious identity as Muslims. The revolutionary tradition of Chinese Muslims 
such as the Hui is thus assumed to be perfectly compatible with, and in a sense 
to count as an expression of, historical loyalty to the ideals of the communist na-
tion-state. In other words, the nexus between a form of revolutionary politics that 
is safely contained within the past on the one hand and multi-ethnic nationalism 
on the other made it possible for “religion” to be bracketed out and preserved in 
a state of relative indeterminacy where it would not endanger the political en-
deavour of building and maintaining a unified nation. There is thus a considerable 
continuity between Bai’s investigations into Hui identity and the treatment of the 
institutionally buttressed relation between religion and ethnicity in contemporary 
Marxist discourse in China. While the religious aspect of Hui identity is never 
completely subsumed within the more “immanent” discourse of ethnic belonging 
in Bai’s writings, his approach ultimately seems to favour the historical materialist 
primacy of the “conditions of existence” of the Hui as a revolutionary nation-
ality par excellence. By contrast, as we saw above, the tendency to collapse the 
boundaries of the ethnic and religious with regard to Hui identity in more recent 
examples of the Chinese Marxist take on Hui identity arguably has the effect of 
theoretically blocking access to any consideration of the actual “conditions of ex-
istence” of Chinese Muslim minorities. Such considerations obviously exceed the 
boundaries of this article as well. One of the most important questions left unan-
swered here is how the historical constitution of Hui identity, as opposed to that 
of other Chinese Muslim minorities, left a minimal space open for renegotiating 
the boundaries between religious, ethnic, and national belonging, a freedom that 
has all but vanished in the case of the Uyghur population of China, even if there 
are signs that repressive measures against religious practice are also increasingly 
being extended to the Hui. Perhaps coming to an understanding of this process 
can provide us with a means to theoretically prepare for engaging with what lies 
outside of the confines of theory. For that is where the people who are the object 
of epistemological and institutional mechanisms of classification and control are 
hopefully still able to spend most of their lives.
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